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THE LAW SCHOOL CLINIC: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
Stephen Wizner*
INTRODUCTION
Felix Frankfurter once claimed that "the law and lawyers are what
the law schools make them."' One need not agree completely with
this statement, insofar as it may exaggerate the effectiveness of law
schools in teaching professional skills, in instilling professional values,
or in affecting the functioning of the legal system, in order to
recognize that legal education has an important role to play in all of
these areas.
There is an important relationship between legal education, the
practice of law, and the functioning of the legal system. While this
proposition should appear obvious to legal educators, it remains a
somewhat controversial assertion within traditional academic faculties
of law. Some legal educators believe that the law school should be an
academic department of the university like all others, where the
pursuit of truth, research and scholarship, and the transmission of
knowledge, are the only proper intellectual activities.2 Some remain
skeptical of the claim that a law school, as a professional school, also
has an educational responsibility to prepare its students to be
competent practitioners, to socialize and acculturate its students into
the values and norms of the legal profession, and to charge its students
with a responsibility for addressing malfunctions in the legal system?
In this brief essay I propose to make, and defend, three related
claims: (1) that there is a vital connection between legal education
and the public interest because lawyers use their education, for better
or worse, in the real world; (2) that the public interest requires law
students to learn they have a social and professional responsibility to
challenge injustice and to pursue social justice in society; and (3) that
* William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Jerald Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Justice in Modem
America 149 (1976).
2. See Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s
to the 1980s, at 277-79 (1983); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Benveen Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L Rev. 34 (1992)
(arguing that, while a legal education should focus on intellectual pursuits, it should
also teach the practical aspects involved in a legal career).
3. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 2, at 232-47.
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the law school clinic is the primary place in the law school where
students can learn to be competent, ethical, socially responsible
lawyers. In order to do this I will need to provide a description of
clinical legal education and an account of its history, and then to
situate it within the law school curriculum.
I. WHAT IS CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
On the most basic level, the law school clinic is a teaching law office
where students can engage in faculty-supervised law practice in a
setting where they are called upon to achieve excellence in practice
and to reflect upon the nature of that practice and its relationship to
law as taught in the classroom and studied in the library. It is a
method of teaching law students to represent clients effectively in the
legal system, and at the same time to develop a critical view of that
system. Law students in the clinic learn that legal doctrine, rules, and
procedure; legal theory; the planning and execution of legal
representation of clients; ethical considerations; and social, economic
and political implications of legal advocacy, are all fundamentally
interrelated.
It is the explicitly pedagogical aspects of clinical legal education that
distinguish it from the work that law students perform in law offices
while attending law school. The law school clinic provides an
instructional program, physically located within the law school
building, and intellectually situated within the law school curriculum.
It is an integral part of the law student's legal education.4
II. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
A. Langdell's Case Method: The "Science" of Law
A century ago, Professor Christopher Columbus Langdell of the
Harvard Law School faculty revolutionized American legal education
by inventing the case method of teaching law. Until that time, legal
education in America had consisted of the study and memorization of
legal treatises, and lectures that purported to set forth what "the law"
was, as the sole form of classroom instruction.' Langdell proposed the
creation of a "science of law" in which students would study the actual
decisions of appellate courts, and, on the basis of what appellate
courts had done in the past, would learn to predict what courts would
do in the future when confronted with similar or analogous legal
disputes. In addition to the study of actual judicial opinions, the use
of lectures for classroom instruction was virtually abandoned in favor
4. Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About
Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980).
5. See Stevens, supra note 2, at 52-64.
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of the so-called "Socratic Method," which involved the interrogation
of students by the professor in order to elicit from them the operative
facts, legal issues, and holdings of the cases they had read. The
Socratic method also included a critical analysis of the arguments and
conclusions contained in the case reports, often through hypothetical
variations of the facts in the cases. The case and Socratic methods of
teaching remain the prevailing mode of instruction in American law
schools today.6
The Langdellian case method revolutionized American legal
education, because it turned students' attention away from doctrinal
treatises to the study of appellate court opinions, and because it
required that students learn to "think like lawyers." Indeed, learning
to think like a lawyer, rather than memorizing rules and doctrine,
became the objective of legal education. Law students were to be
taught abstract, hypothetical, deductive, critical-thinking skills, and to
be discouraged from the mere memorization of rules and doctrine.
The problem with Langdell's approach to legal education was that it
was static and unreal; static because it focused entirely on past judicial
decisions and not on the underlying principles and methods of legal
thought and law reform; unreal because the law is constantly growing
and changing in ways that cannot be predicted through the study of
past appellate court opinions. Moreover, learning to think like a
lawyer is only part of what a law student needs to learn in order to be
a well-educated lawyer.'
B. From Langdell to Legal Realism
Beginning in the 1930s a group of academics at the Yale Law
School, together with colleagues at Columbia and one or two other
law schools, developed a new approach to the study of law, which they
called "legal realism." The legal realists shifted the focus from past
judicial decisions as predictors of future decisions to the role of
lawyers and judges in making the law "work" to carry out its social
role and function. They sought to replace Langdell's "science of law"
with a functional approach to the study of law.9
The legal realists developed an anti-formalist theory of law. They
taught that law is not static, but is an ever-changing instrumentality to
be used in solving social and economic problems. Therefore, they did
not state, or restate, what the law was, but encouraged students to
study and think about how the law came to be what it was, whose ends
it served, why it should not be changed, and the role of lawyers and
6. See id. at 247, 268-69, 276-78.
7. Id. at 64.
8. See Stephen Wizner, Is Learning to "Think Like a Lawyer" Enough?, 17 Yale
L. & Pol'y Rev. 583 (1998).
9. See Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960 (1986); Stevens, supra
note 2, at 155-63.
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judges in changing it. The legal realists encouraged students to
question existing legal rules and arrangements. They challenged
students to think about and propose law reforms that would address
problems in the society and inadequacies of the existing legal system.
The legal realists emphasized legal craft and law reform. They
taught the importance of facts to legal analysis and argumentation.
They contended that lawyers should use the tools of the social
sciences to study and understand the real world in which law
functioned. They argued that law must be flexible and must serve
social needs, and that lawyers and judges should learn to use law to
respond to those needs and to further social ends.
In their emphasis on the ways in which real life and social
conditions shape law, and on the ways in which law can and should
respond to social needs, the legal realists were seeking to reconcile
legal theory and legal practice. That reconciliation was' to be achieved
by constructing a functional theory of law that reflected and informed
legal practice.
The legal realists taught that legal education should expose students
to the dynamic relationship between theory and practice-that good
theory is practical, and that good practice is informed by theory. In
the words of Jerome N. Frank, one of the patriarchs of the legal realist
movement, "An interest in the practical should not preclude, on the
contrary it should invite, a lively interest in theory. For practices
unavoidably blossom into theories, and most theories induce
practices, good or bad.""l Frank published two law review articles, the
first in 1933 and the second in 1947, in which he advocated the
transformation of law schools into what he called "clinical lawyer
schools," where students would learn the interaction of legal theory
and legal practice."
In 1935, Columbia Law School professor Karl Llewellyn, another of
the founders of the legal realist movement, gave a talk at Harvard
entitled On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education." In his
talk, Llewellyn criticized the formalist legal education of that time and
called for its replacement by a functional approach to legal education
that emphasized legal theory and what he called "ordered practical
experience.' 3 It is this notion of "ordered practical experience,"
informed by legal theory, and taught in the law school by law school
faculty, that lies behind clinical legal education.
The legal realists did not advocate transforming law schools into
trade schools that provided only technical training in the practical
10. Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 Yale L.J. 1303,1321 (1947).
11. Id.; Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907
(1933).
12. K.N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35
Colum. L. Rev. 651 (1935).
13. Id. at 658.
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skills of the lawyer. On the contrary, they proposed to make legal
education more useful by making it more theoretical, even as they
introduced ordered practical experience into the curriculum. Proper
legal education, they contended, should involve the constant
interaction of theory and practice, not the learning of rules and
doctrine.
C. The Rise of Clinical Legal Education
The intellectual roots of clinical legal education date back to the
legal realist movement that began in the 1930s.1' But it was not until
the late 1960s that clinical legal education received financial support
and found an effective advocate in the person of William Pincus, a
Vice-President of the Ford Foundation who was responsible for the
Foundation's anti-poverty initiatives." Pincus, who happened to be a
lawyer, supported legal services programs for the poor, and believed
that law schools had a role to play in addressing the lack of access to
justice of poor people with legal problems. 16 Pincus persuaded the
Ford Foundation to provide funding for a new foundation that he
would head, to be called the Council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility ("CLEPR"), that would provide grants to
law schools to establish legal clinics to serve the poor." Ford provided
$6 million in initial funding, and wvith that financial backing, Pincus set
out on his crusade to transform American legal education.18
Starting with a small number of demonstration grants at a handful
of law schools in the late '60s and early '70s, within a very few years,
Pincus had succeeded in introducing clinical legal education into the
majority of American law schools.1 9 Law schools that received start-
up grants from CLEPR had to agree to continue the clinics as part of
the law school curriculum after the initial funding ran out, and most of
them did. Thirty years ago only a half-dozen or so law schools had
clinical programs, all of them funded by the Ford Foundation through
CLEPR.20 Today, virtually all of the more than 100 law schools in the
14. There had been a few isolated experiments with law school clinics at Denver,
Duke, and Southern California universities during the 1920s and 1930s. See, e.g., John
S. Bradway, Legal Aid Clinic as a Law School Course, 3 S. Cal. L Rev. 320 (1930);
John S. Bradway, New Developments in the Legal Clinic Field, 13 St. Louis L Rev.
122 (1928); John S. Bradway, The Beginning of rite Legal Clinic of the University of
Southern California, 2 S. Cal. L Rev. 252 (1929).
15. Laura G. Holland, Invading the Ivory Tower: The History of Clinical
Education at Yale Law School, 49 J. Legal Educ. 504,516-17 (1999).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Stevens, supra note 2, at 240-41; Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical
Education for this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 Clinical L Rev. 1, 18-21 (2000);
Holland, supra note 15, at 516-17.
19. Barry et al., supra note 18, at 19-20.
20. Id.
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United States have clinical programs2' (as do some in Canada, Great
Britain, Australia, Latin America, Europe, China, Israel, and
elsewhere). In the United States, clinical programs are now included
as permanent lines in law school budgets. 2 It is not an exaggeration
to conclude that clinical legal education represents the most
significant reform in American legal education since Christopher
Langdell's invention of the case method at Harvard a century earlier.
III. LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
Clinics serving low-income clients offer especially valuable
opportunities for students to learn how the law functions, or fails to
function, for the have-nots. 23
Skills-training through the representation of clients was to be the
methodology of clinical legal education. But its educational goal was
far more ambitious. It was to get students out of the classroom into
the real world of law, from which they would return to the classroom
with a deeper understanding of how legal doctrine and legal theory
actually work-or don't work.24 It was to teach law students about the
actual functioning (and malfunctioning) of the legal system, and to
instill in them the value and duty of public service.25
It is a basic assumption of clinical legal education that students can
be motivated to learn by being given the responsibility for assisting
real clients with their legal problems. As the student becomes aware
of the reality of a client's legal situation, and how important legal
representation is to the resolution of the client's problems, the student
will become ever more conscious of her responsibility to the client.
The student's feeling of personal responsibility in representing an
individual client can grow into a feeling of social responsibility for the
21. Id. at 20.
22. Id. at 21.
23. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
199 (2000).
24. In the words of William Pincus, "students have been well insulated from the
more miserable facts of the administration or maladministration of justice by being
confined to the classroom and casebooks." William Pincus, Concepts of Justice and of
Legal Education Today, in Clinical Education for Law Students 125, 131 (1980).
Elsewhere he wrote:
[Clinical education] can develop in the future lawyer a sensitivity to
malfunctioning and injustice in the machinery of justice and the other
arrangements of society... [and can enable students] to learn to recognize
what is wrong with the society around [them]-particularly what is wrong
with the machinery of justice in which [they are] participating and for which
[they have] a special responsibility.
William Pincus, Educational Values in Clinical Experience for Law Students, Council
Legal Educ. for Prof. Resp. Newsl., Sept. 1969, at 31-2, reprinted in Council for Legal
Education for Professional Responsibility Newsletters 1969-72, at 31-32.
25. I have made this claim previously in a different context. See Stephen Wizner,
Beyond Skills Training, 7 Clinical L. Rev. 327,329 (2001).
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provision of legal services to the poor. As the student realizes that, in
all likelihood, the client would not have access to legal assistance but
for the law student and the clinic, her consciousness is raised.
This awakening to a sense of social responsibility occurs when
students represent low-income clients who are seeking to protect their
basic interests in income, liberty, or fairness. Therefore, providing
legal representation to low-income clients, both individually and
through group representation, has been the basis of clinical practice
and teaching. There are important lessons about the role of law and
lawyers, and about social justice, to be learned from working on such
cases.
What do students learn from representing clients in the law school
clinic that they would not learn from their regular academic courses?
First and foremost, they learn that many social problems, like poverty,
can be seen and acted upon as legal problems. Second, they learn that
legal representation is as necessary to the resolution of complex legal
problems of the poor as it is to those of the affluent. Third, they learn
to develop and apply legal theory through the actual representation of
clients. Fourth, they learn to use the legal system to seek social
change. And finally, they learn the limits of law in solving individual
and social problems. Through this experience the students are
required to confront social and economic injustice, and to act on the
professional obligation of lawyers to engage in public service and to
provide legal assistance to those who cannot afford to pay for it.
These are all important intellectual and ethical lessons for law
students to learn.
CONCLUSION
The founders of the clinical legal education movement, responding
to the social ferment and legal rights explosion in America during the
1960s, envisioned clinical legal education not only as a way of
enriching legal education with professional training, but as a means of
stimulating law schools to attend to the legal needs of the poor and
minorities, and engaging students in the pursuit of social justice in
American society.
A central goal of clinical legal education has been to provide
professional education in the interests of justice. Its pedagogical
objectives are to teach students to employ legal knowledge, legal
theory, and legal skills to meet individual and social needs; to expose
students to the ways in which law can work either to advance or to
subvert public welfare and social justice; to instill in students a
professional obligation to perform pubic service; and to "challenge[]
tendencies in the students toward opportunism and social
irresponsibility."
26. Duncan Kennedy, How the Law Sdzool Fails: A Polemic, 1 Yale Rev. L &
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The law school clinic plays a unique role in exposing students to
social and economic injustice in society. By providing legal assistance
to low-income clients who cannot afford to pay for legal
representation, law students learn not only about the importance of
lawyers in resolving clients' legal problems, but they also learn about
poverty and the circumstances of the poor first-hand and
experientially, not just as a study of statistics, social policy, and
legislation. This is an important lesson, and one that challenges the
implicit message of the rest of the law school curriculum, in which law
is taught as if everyone in society has equal access to it.
The professional behavior of law school graduates-what they do
with the legal education they receive in law school-is not a
primordial given. It can be affected by the education they receive in
law school, as well as by existing social and economic arrangements in
the society in which they will serve as lawyers.
Today, outside of a relatively small number of academic purists, the
majority of law teachers would subscribe to the notion that law
teachers have at least some responsibility for the socialization and
acculturation of law students into the norms and values of the legal
profession. The law school clinic provides an educational setting in
which that is a primary objective.
Law school graduates become practitioners, leaders of the bar,
judges, government bureaucrats, politicians, legislators, teachers, and
scholars. In those roles they implement, interpret, challenge, justify,
and help create the legal rules through which power is defined,
allocated, exercised, and denied in the real world. The practice of law
is as much about power as it is about legal knowledge. Law schools
have a responsibility to teach students about their social and
professional responsibilities in exercising the power of law.
Law students need to be reminded that "justice" is not something
that emerges ipso facto from the existing legal system. They need to
be taught that law is not simply a value-free or value-neutral
mechanism for dispute resolution and the protection of private
interests, but is also a political mechanism for the acquisition, exercise,
and defense of power. They need to learn not only about the
importance of legal representation, but also about the maldistribution
of legal services in the society, and the resulting lack of access to
justice and perpetuation of social inequality.
In the real world the majority of low-income people cannot afford
legal services that, in many instances, are essential to the just
resolution of their legal problems. This is a malfunction in the legal
system that renders the ideal of equality before the law an empty
promise. Law schools have virtually ignored this malfunction. They
have failed to commit intellectual and financial resources to teaching,
Soc. Action 71, 80 (1970).
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research, and writing aimed at exposing, analyzing, and addressing
social justice issues. With few exceptions, they have failed to play a
critical role in studying the state of the justice system and what needs
to be done to repair it, in teaching students about this, and in
proposing and advocating the necessary reforms.
Lawyers should see themselves as trustees of justice. On them rests
a fiduciary responsibility to see to it that the legal system provides, as
far as practically possible, justice for all citizens, not only for the rich
and powerful. Law teachers share that responsibility.2 As members
of the legal profession, they must take on the responsibility, through
their teaching, research, writing, and example, of striving to
democratize the legal culture. It is in this regard that the law school
clinic can provide legal education in the interests of justice.
27. For an excellent description of the role of law school clinical instructors in
teaching about social justice, see Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 Clinical L
Rev. 287 (2001).
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